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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NONTRADITIONAL MONETARY POLICY: THE 
CASE OF JAPAN*1 
Yuzo Honda (Kansai University) 
The effectiveness of nontraditional monetary policy is controversial at least in Japan. 
Making use of data from the quantitative easing monetary policy period, this paper 
presents statistical evidence on the effectiveness of nontraditional monetary policy. We 
empirically demonstrate that quantitative easing monetary policy, adopted by the Bank 
of Japan for the period from March 2001 to March 2006, had a stimulating effect on 
investment and production at least through Tobin’s q channel. We also provide a simple 
and operational model in which an injection of base money lowers the interest rate on 
bonds, reduces the required rate of returns from capital stocks, and depreciates the value 
of domestic currency. 
Key Words: Quantitative Easing, Vector Autoregressions, Stocks, Tobin’s q, Asset 
Markets 
JEL Classification Number: E51. 
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1. Introduction 
As soon as the new governor Haruhiko Kuroda and vice-governors took office at the 
Bank of Japan (BOJ) in April 2013, they started a new “quantitative easing” (QE) 
monetary policy in order to attain the targeted rate of inflation of 2% in around two 
years. Prior to this, the BOJ also adopted a QE strategy for the period from March 2001 
to March 2006. We define “QE monetary policy” as injection of more new 
high-powered money into the economy by the central bank than is required for the 
short-term interest rate to reach 0%. 
In an attempt to reverse the rapid deterioration of the US economy in December 
2008, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) also set the federal funds rate at 0–0.25%, and 
purchased large amounts of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities to support the 
US housing market. Ben Bernanke, chairman of the FRB, called this policy “Credit 
Easing (CE)”, as the FRB’s operating target was on the asset side, rather than the 
liability side, of its balance sheet. However, when the FRB purchases large amounts of 
securities, it expands not only the asset side but also the liability side of its balance 
sheet. Hence, the effect of the US CE policy obviously also includes the impact of QE. 
The relevant question confronting central bankers is how effective QE or CE is in 
stimulating the real economy. If QE or CE is not effective, central bankers obviously 
want to avoid taking the risk of implementing unprecedented measures and incurring 
unpredictable disastrous side effects in the future. 
Indeed, the former governor of the BOJ (Shirakawa, 2008) and the director in charge 
of monetary policy, Amemiya (Japanese Economic Association (JEA), 2012) are 
skeptical about the effectiveness of nontraditional monetary policy on macroeconomic 
variables. Kimura et al. (2002) and Fujiwara (2006), BOJ officials, also express the 
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skepticism about the effectiveness of QE on macroeconomic variables, though the data 
in their empirical studies do not cover the entire QE period. 
In the academic literature, there are two alternative views on the effectiveness of QE. 
The first view dates back to at least Hicks (1937). Hicks shows that, when the interest 
rate reaches the lower bound, money becomes a perfect substitute, and that pumping 
money into the economy under this condition has little effect in stimulating the 
economy. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Curdia and Woodford (2010) also 
analyze dynamic general equilibrium models and reach similar conclusions. 
Under a different set of assumptions, however, Bernanke and Reinhart (2004), 
Bernanke et al. (2004), and Clouse et al. (2003) argue that the central bank, even when 
facing very low interest rates, has at least three alternative monetary policy measures to 
stimulate the economy. The first measure is through “expectations” of the future path of 
short-term interest rates. Under normal circumstances, the central bank has a strong 
influence on the short end of the term structure of interest rates. Hence the central bank 
may make explicit or implicit commitments on the future path of monetary policy (some 
examples might include statements such as “The FRB will keep the current QE strategy 
until at least the end of year 2014” or “The BOJ will keep the current zero interest 
policy until concerns about possible deflation disappear”). By committing to 
expansionary monetary policy, the central bank may change market “expectations” of 
the future path of short-term interest rates, and lower longer-term interest rates today 
through arbitrage between short-term and the longer-term rates of interest. This is called 
the “time duration effect”. 
The second alternative measure is through changes in the composition of assets on 
the balance sheet of the central bank. In general, the long-term interest rate may be 
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taken as the sum of the short-term interest, liquidity premium (premium paid for lack of 
liquidity), term premium (premium paid for the length of maturity), and risk premium 
(premium paid for default risk). Should a financial crisis occur, the risk premium on 
long-term interest rates would rise sharply. If the central bank should purchase large 
quantities of private securities, for example, as the FRB did in the face of the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the central bank accepts the default risk of the 
private sector, mitigates the sharp rise in the risk premium, and thus lowers longer-term 
interest rates today. 
The third alternative measure is a QE strategy, which has effects through changes in 
the size of the balance sheet of the central bank. While the second measure above 
focuses on the effects of changes in the asset side of the central bank’s balance sheet, 
this third method pays close attention to the effects of changes in the liability side. 
Expanding the quantity of base money on the liability side of the balance sheet, the 
central bank induces the private sector to change their portfolios (called “portfolio 
rebalancing effects”) and/or “expectations” of the future path of short-term interest rates 
(called “signaling effects”). When the central bank injects large quantities of base 
money into the economy, private investors holding the extra base money might 
purchase imperfect substitute assets, raise the price of these assets, and thus stimulate 
the real economy (“portfolio rebalancing effects”). The massive injection of base money 
into the economy by the central bank may signal an expansionary monetary policy 
stance to the market, lower expectations of the future path of short-term interest rates, 
and thus reduce longer-term interest rates today (“signaling effects”). 
The QE or CE monetary policy actually adopted in the US, UK, and Japan combines 
the above three alternative measures. An example of the second alternative measure is 
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the adoption of a CE policy in December 2008 by the FRB involving the purchase of 
large amounts of private financial assets; however, it is also an example of the third 
measure in part as it involved the injection of a large quantity of high-powered money 
into the economy, expanding the size of the FRB balance sheet. The QE monetary 
policy that the BOJ adopted from March 2001 to March 2006, on the other hand, is an 
example of the third alternative measure; however, it is also an example of the second 
alternative in part as the BOJ purchased short- or long-term government securities, 
which might have different effects on the real economy. 
Whether nontraditional monetary policy measures have real effects or not is 
controversial and still an ongoing question, largely because of a lack of sufficient data 
to identify the impacts of nontraditional monetary policy measures. 
The JEA organized a panel discussion on the “Evaluation of Nontraditional 
Monetary Policy” at the 2011 Autumn Meeting of the Association, a summary of which 
was published as chapter 7 of JEA (2012). Some panelists were skeptical about the 
effectiveness of the nontraditional monetary policy measures on the macroeconomy. 
One panelist asserted that the QE monetary policy adopted by the BOJ for the period 
from March 2001 to March 2006 was effective in promoting the stabilization of the 
financial system rather than in stimulating the macroeconomy through portfolio 
rebalancing effects. Another panelist also asserted that it was nothing more than a 
placebo effect on the macroeconomy, should there be any, from nontraditional monetary 
policy measures. 
However, these assertions were made with no or little empirical evidence. The 
purpose of this paper is to show that these assertions are in conflict with statistical data. 
Rather, the data suggest that QE monetary policy by the BOJ had significant impacts on 
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production through changes in stock prices. Furthermore, Tobin’s q was operating as a 
channel through which monetary policy shocks were transmitted to investment in the 
real sector. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the results of our 
vector autoregressions (VAR) models. Finding that stock prices play a key role in the 
empirical results, in Section 3 we briefly explain the four possible channels through 
which changes in stock prices are transmitted to the real macroeconomy. In Section 4, 
we examine the relationship between stock prices and the volume of newly issued 
stocks and the value of fixed investment, during the QE period. In Section 5, we discuss 
the impacts of QE monetary policy on bank lending and prices. In Section 6, we 
propose a simple and operational model that is consistent with the observed data. 
Section 7 summarizes our findings. 
2. Vector autoregressions 
This section summarizes the results of vector autoregression analysis in our two joint 
papers, Honda, Kuroki and Tachibana(2007; HKT hereafter), and Honda and Tachibana 
(2011; HT hereafter).  
In assessing the effectiveness of monetary policy, it is common to include variables for 
production, prices, and the short-term interest rate in the VAR. During the QE period 
from March 2001 to March 2006, however, the BOJ used the total balance of bank 
reserves (TBBR) as their operating target, because the overnight call rate (the standard 
operating target) was stuck at virtually zero percent. Hence, if we restrict our data to the 
period March 2001 to March 2006, and if we replace the short-term interest rate by 
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TBBR, we can directly apply the above standard VAR method to analyze the 
effectiveness of nontraditional monetary policy during the QE period. 
The problem with this approach is that the sample period is very short with only 60 
months of data. Hence, we have to be parsimonious in our model specification. We start 
with the simplest three variable VAR model with indices of industrial production (y), 
consumer price index (p), and TBBR. All variables are in levels. The Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) suggests a lag of two months. 
With the above three-variable VAR, the results are clear. TBBR affects production y. 
Then, we examine through which channel the variation in TBBR affects y. To be 
parsimonious in our model specification, we add just one variable at a time. As a fourth 
variable, we use various variables, including government bond rates of different 
maturities, stock prices, exchange rates; we found that stock prices have a significant 
influence on production. Therefore, we include stock prices as the fourth variable in our 
four-variable VAR model. As for the data on TBBR, the results are virtually the same, 
whether we use the realized balances of bank reserves or the target numbers officially 
announced by the BOJ. 
The results for the four-variable VAR model indicate that changes in the TBBR 
target by the BOJ immediately lead to changes in stock prices and then to changes in 
production with a time lag. That is, changes in the operating target of TBBR are 
transmitted to production via changes in stock prices. Granger causality tests, impulse 
response analysis, and variance decompositions unanimously support these results. 
These are the main results in our first paper, HKT(2007). Our results largely agree with 
those in Wieland (2009). The weakness of HKT is that our sample size was so small 
that the results may not be robust. 
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To improve statistical inference, Honda and Tachibana(2011) extend the sample 
period: from March 2001–March 2006 to January 1996–March 2010, thereby increasing 
the sample size from 60 to 171 months. Introducing dummy variables into VAR, we 
fully exploit prior information that the central bank changed their operating target from 
the short-term interest rate to TBBR for the QE period. With the larger samples, the 
AIC leads us to choose four-month lag models. 
We consider three kinds of VAR models in Table 1. Model (i) is a simple 
five-variable VAR, including prices (p), production (y), the overnight call rate (r), stock 
prices (s), and the actual TBBR (m) multiplied by the dummy variable (d1), where d1 
takes the value 1 during the QE period, and 0 otherwise. In ordinary times, the BOJ set 
its operating target at the overnight call rate. With the overnight call rate at close to zero 
percent during the QE period, however, the BOJ used TBBR as their operating target. 
This is why we include the variable TBBR (m) during the QE period only in model (i). 
“c”, “c1”, and “c2” in Model (i) denote (5  1) vectors of intercept parameters. 
<Table 1 around here> 
Model (ii) is a six-variable VAR, including two dummy variables, d1 and d2, where 
the second dummy variable d2 takes the value 0 during the QE period, and 1 otherwise. 
Model (i) has the shortcoming of treating the QE period and other time periods 
asymmetrically, because the variable (d1  m) takes the value m during the QE period, 
and 0 otherwise. With the second dummy variable (d2  m) included, Model (ii) treats 
the QE period and other time periods symmetrically, and allows the variable TBBR (m) 
to have different dynamic effects on other variables during the QE period compared 
with the other time periods. Model (ii) has an advantage over Model (i) in that we can 
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treat the QE period and other time periods symmetrically, but at the cost of reduced 
efficiency of estimation with an increased number of parameters. 
Model (iii) assumes that the effects of TBBR on the other variables might be 
different between the three periods, the QE period, before the QE period, and after the 
QE period. Model (iii) includes three dummy variables, d1, d3, and d4, where d3 takes 
the value 1 during the pre-QE period only and 0 otherwise, and d4 takes the value 1 
during the post-QE period only and 0 otherwise. 
By increasing the sample size from 60 in HKT to 171 in HT, we can obtain more 
precise estimates of the relationships between the macroeconomic variables, and 
thereby increase the statistical power of the hypothesis tests on the effectiveness of QE. 
The qualitative results in HT (2011) are virtually the same as in HKT (2007). 
Figure 1 reports the responses of prices (p), production (y), and stock prices (s) to a 
one standard deviation shock in TBBR (m). The dotted lines indicate the 90% 
confidence bounds, obtained by Monte Carlo simulation using 500 repetitions. In all 
three models, the responses in prices (core CPI) are negligible, but those in production 
(IIP) and stock prices are significantly different from zero. Stock prices react 
immediately but production reacts with a time lag, as expected. 
<Figure 1 around here> 
Bernanke and Reinhart (2004), and Bernanke et al. (2004) suggest that the central 
bank has at least three alternative monetary policy measures even when facing the zero 
bound constraint of short-term interest rates. 
During the QE period, the BOJ set the operating target at TBBR, but at the same time 
took full advantage of other means explained by Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) and 
Bernanke et al. (2004). Therefore, the main message in HKT (2007) is that 
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nontraditional monetary policy as a package has significant impacts on production 
through changes in stock prices. 
Table 2 shows our estimates of an increase of 1 trillion yen in TBBR on prices, 
production, and stock prices evaluated at the mean value of TBBR. Although the 
impacts of policy shocks on stock prices and production are statistically significant, 
estimates vary across models probably because of the small samples in the QE period. 
The original estimates by HKT (2007) are much larger than those by HT (2011). The 
estimates in Model (iii) are the largest, while those in Model (i) are the smallest of the 
three models. 
<Table 2 around here> 
3. Alternative transmission channels through stock prices 
HKT (2007) and HT (2011) suggest that stock prices play an important role in 
transmitting monetary shocks to the real sector even when short-term interest rates are 
very low. There are at least four possible channels through which financial shocks are 
transmitted to the real sector. The first is the channel of the well-known Tobin’s q. 
Second, increases or decreases in the value of stocks or real estate change the value 
of collateral when agents borrow money from markets. Higher stock prices make it 
easier for potential borrowers to obtain external funds from markets, and thus tend to 
increase investment (see, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1995) and Kiyotaki 
and Moore (1997)). 
Third, Japanese banks are allowed to hold up to 5% of the existing stock of a 
corporation. The difference between the purchase price and the market price of stocks is 
hidden reserves (fukumi-eki in Japanese). Tier II bank capital includes 45% of hidden 
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reserves. Therefore, rises in stock prices increase banks’ hidden reserves and thus Tier 
II bank capital. Increased bank capital in turn enables banks to make more loans, and 
thus tends to increase investment. 
Finally, rises in stock prices make households wealthier, which increases 
consumption (called “wealth effects”). 
4. Transmission channel via Tobin’s q 
4.1 Stock prices and newly issued stocks 
There are at least four possible channels through which changes in stock prices affect 
the real sector. Among these four channels, this paper only focuses on the first, the 
Tobin q channel, and finds that it plays a crucial role in transmitting financial shocks to 
the real sector. In particular, we demonstrate that firms are very sensitive to the value of 
stocks in issuing new stocks. That is, when stock prices rise, firms tend to issue larger 
amounts of new stocks, and are likely to spend more, which in turn increases physical 
investment. 
4.1.1 Correlation 
Figure 2 shows the changes in stock prices (Nikkei 225) and the corresponding amounts 
of newly issued stocks (including convertible bonds and warrants) during the QE 
period, March 2001 to March 2006. 
<Figure 2 around here> 
The Japanese government injected bank capital of about 1.8 trillion yen to Resona 
Bank in March 2003. The government rescued the bank to avoid the possibility of 
contagion effects spreading to the rest of the Japanese economy. March 2003 is clearly 
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an outlier in our dataset, and we exclude this outlier from Figure 2 and also from our 
statistical analysis. 
Figure 2 shows a downward trend in stock prices before March 2003, but an upward 
trend after that. Comparing the former period of 24 months (March 2001 to February 
2003) with the latter period of 36 months (April 2003 to March 2006), we observe the 
tendency that the amount of newly issued stocks for the latter period is clearly larger 
than that in the former period. The average amount of newly issued stocks increased 
from 213 billion yen in the former period to 356 billion yen in the latter period, a rise of 
67%. With a t-value of 2.55, we reject the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level 
that the means of the amounts of newly issued stocks are equal between the two 
subsamples. 
Since the average stock price (Nikkei 225) increased from 10,699 yen in the former 
period to 11,608 yen in the latter, the data suggest that there is a positive correlation 
between stock prices and the amount of newly issued stocks. This assertion is also 
supported by the data. The correlation coefficient is 0.34 between stock prices and the 
amount of newly issued stocks. 
4.1.2 Causality from stock prices to newly issued stocks 
A comparison between the two subsamples shows that the rate of increase in the 
average amount of newly issued stocks of 67% is far greater than the corresponding rate 
of increase in stock prices of 8.5%. This finding supports Tobin’s q, suggesting 
causality from stock prices to newly issued stocks. That is, the higher stock prices 
induce firms to issue larger amounts of stocks. The ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates of the relationship between stock prices st and the amount of newly issued 
stocks at are: 
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 at = –188,975 + 43.366 st. (1) 
 (1.06) (2.77) 
Figure 3 shows a scatter plot and the fitted OLS line. The sample period covers 
March 2001 to March 2006 with the outlier of March 2003 excluded. The t-values of 
the estimates are in parentheses and indicate that stock prices st affect the amount of 
newly issued stocks at at the 1% significance level, consistent with the hypothesis that 
Tobin’s q is working as a transmission channel from the financial to the real sector. 
<Figure 3 around here> 
4.2 Stock prices and investment 
Was the increase in newly issued stocks the cause of the increased investment in the 
latter half of the QE period? In this subsection, we address this question, making use of 
both monthly and quarterly data. We use “Machinery Orders”, a prominent leading 
indicator for monthly data, and “Fixed Investment” data for quarterly data. 
4.2.1 Stock prices and machinery orders 
Figure 4 is a scatterplot diagram of stock prices and machinery orders for the period 
from March 2001 to March 2006, excluding March 2003. The estimated equation is: 
 bt = 868,548 + 105.16 st, (2) 
                           (1.75)    (2.40) 
where bt denotes machinery orders, and the t-values are in parentheses. Equation (2) 
shows that a rise in stock prices increases machinery orders significantly at the 1% 
level. 
<Figure 4 around here> 
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To avoid possible simultaneous equation bias, we also regress machinery orders on 
stock prices with a lag of one month, st–1, and find results similar to those of equation 
(2) with the t-value of the coefficient estimate of st–1 significant at the 5% level. 
4.2.2 Stock prices and fixed investment 
Now we turn to quarterly data. Using three-month-average data of stock prices, St, and 
regressing fixed investment It+4 on stock prices, St, we obtain the following OLS 
estimates and t-values: 
 It+4 = 12517.13 + 0.42 St. (3) 
 (5.74) (2.18) 
The sample period covers the first quarter of 2001 to the first quarter of 2006, for a 
sample of only 21 observations. The sample size is too small to identify the effects of 
other variables accurately. Hence, we should be cautious about the interpretation of 
estimation results in equation (3). Nevertheless, the t-value of the estimate of stock 
prices St is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The results for both the monthly data and quarterly data above are consistent with the 
hypothesis that higher stock prices induced firms to issue larger amounts of new stocks, 
which in turn lead to increases in fixed investment and production. 
5. Deleveraging and prices 
In the previous sections, we analyzed firm behavior in the stock market for the QE 
period. In this section, we now examine firm and bank behavior in lending markets for 
this period. 
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Figure 5 depicts the total amount of bank loans for the QE period. The total balance 
of bank loans starts at around 469 trillion yen in March 2001 and declines almost 
monotonically until January 2004 at a rate of 21.4 trillion yen per year. Over this period, 
it was believed that there were three excesses in the economy, excess capital stock, 
excess stock of labor, and excess debt balance. Banks were collecting money back from 
customers and firms were repaying loans. The lending channel had virtually shut down. 
The impacts of this deleveraging were enormous. The decline in bank loans of 21.4 
trillion yen per year is large relative to 3.9 trillion yen of newly issued stocks per year 
(monthly average of 61 samples, from March 2001 to March 2006 with an outlier of 
March 2003 included, multiplied by 12). They had contractionary and deflationary 
effects on the national economy. The QE strategy adopted in March 2001 and the seven 
subsequent increases in the operating targets by the BOJ could not prevent this 
downward trend in bank lending immediately. However, pumping large amounts of 
base money into the economy seems also to have had effects in bank loan markets, and 
raising the operating target to 30–35 trillion yen in January 2004 seems to have stopped 
the downward deleveraging trend. 
<Figure 5 around here> 
As shown in Figure 5, the total balance of bank loans reached a low of about 388 
trillion yen in June 2005, and subsequently increased slightly. However, the BOJ 
suddenly abandoned its QE strategy in March 2006. We believe that this sudden exit 
from QE was probably too early for lending markets to return to normal, and for the 
Japanese economy to commence a strong recovery. This is why we find that 
expansionary nontraditional monetary policy during the QE period had no significant 
impact on prices in our VAR analysis in previous sections. 
16 
6. A simple analytic model 
In this section, we propose a simple and operational model that is consistent with the 
statistical evidence presented in previous sections. The model we employ is an 
extension of Tobin (1969) and Yabushita (2009). 
Before we proceed to our model, recall that bank loan markets were virtually not 
operating during the QE period. Taking this fact into account, we assume for purely 
analytic convenience that there are no bank loan markets. That is, we discard bank loans 
and deposits from our analysis in the following model. “Money” is the central bank 
money and does not include deposits in our discussion in this section. 
6.1 Four-asset model 
Following Tobin, for analytical purposes we regard the income account variables as 
exogenous data for portfolio choice behavior, and find equilibrium in the markets for 
stocks of assets conditional upon assumed values of outputs, incomes, and other flow 
variables. This strategy is the same as the one we employ when constructing the “LM 
curve” in macroeconomics. The key behavioral assumption here is that spending 
decisions and portfolio decisions are independent. 
Yabushita (2009) constructs two types of financial market models, both of which are 
composed of three asset markets. Given the importance of stock prices, as we see in 
previous sections, and given the significance of foreign exchange rates, as we find in 
Hamada et al. (2010), we extend Yabushita’s models to one with four assets; money, 
bonds, capital stocks, and foreign assets. 
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6.2 Demand for assets 
The respective demand for money (M), bonds (B), stocks (V), and foreign assets (F) 
depends on their relative asset yields, GDP (Y), and wealth (WS): 
 Money: M = M(i, r, z, Y, WS) 
 Bonds: B = B(i, r, z, Y, WS) 
 Stocks: V = V(i, r, z, Y, WS) 
 Foreign Assets: F = F(i, r, z, Y, WS). (4) 
We assume that bonds, stocks, and foreign assets yield returns of interest rate (i), 
stock returns (r), and foreign asset returns (z), but that money yields no return. 
The expected rate of return from holding foreign assets z is the sum of two 
components, the interest rate on foreign bonds and the expected rate of change in the 
exchange rate E[e/e], where E[*] denotes the expectation operator. We assume z is 
exogenous throughout the paper. 
We also assume that the assets are “gross substitutes” in standard microeconomics 
terminology: the demand for each asset varies directly with its own rate of return and 
inversely with other rates. In symbols, the own derivatives of the respective demand 
functions: 
 (B/i, V/r, F/z), 
are positive and the cross-derivatives are nonpositive. 
Just as there is a budget constraint in standard microeconomics, we have a balance 
sheet constraint: the total demand for the four assets sums to the total demand for wealth 
in the economy W: 
 W = M(i, r, z, Y, WS) + B(i, r, z, Y, WS) + V(i, r, z, Y, WS) + F(i, r, z, Y, WS). (5) 
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When any one of the returns (j = i, r, z) changes, the demand for each asset reacts to 
this, but the sum of the changes in the demand for each asset is assumed to be zero. That 
is: 
 Mj + Bj + Vj + Fj = 0 for j = i, r, z, (6) 
where subscript j denotes partial derivatives with respect to j = i, r, z. 
When exogenous total wealth increases, we have: 
 MW + BW + VW + FW = 1, (7) 
where subscript w denotes a partial derivative with respect to total wealth WS. 
6.3 Supply of assets 
The central bank exogenously supplies the money stock, MS. The government and firms 
jointly determine the supply of bonds, PBBS, where PB and BS denote the price and the 
quantity of bonds outstanding, respectively. 
Firms provide the supply of stocks, qKS, where q and KS denote the market-value 
price of one unit of physical capital and the stock of physical capital, respectively, or 
alternatively, the stock price and the total number of stocks outstanding, respectively. 
The reproduction cost of one unit of physical capital is assumed to be one, and remains 
constant throughout the discussion. 
We denote the supply of foreign assets by eFS, where e and FS are the exchange rate 
measured in yen per unit of foreign currency, and the total balance of foreign assets 
measured in foreign currency, respectively. The exchange rate e is endogenous, but FS is 
assumed to be determined exogenously. 
6.4 Inverse relations between market prices and returns 
We assume that there is an inverse relation between bond price, PB, and interest rate, i: 
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 dPB/di < 0. (8) 
Similarly, we also assume that an inverse relation: 
 dq/dr < 0, (9) 
also holds for capital stocks. 
One simple intuitive explanation for inequalities (8) and (9) is as follows. Consider 
consols that produce one yen per year. The market value of these consols PB is given by 
PB = 1/i. There is indeed an inverse relation between the price of bonds PB and the 
interest rate i. 
In a similar manner, consider one unit of physical capital that produces real return R 
(assumed to be exogenous) per year. Then, the market value of this physical capital q is 
given by q = R/r. An inverse relation holds again in this case between stock prices q and 
the rate of return on capital stocks r, where r is the rate of return on stocks required for 
market investors to be induced to hold capital stocks in their portfolios. 
6.5 Market equilibrium 
The market equilibrium conditions are given by the four equations: 
 MS = M(i, r, z, Y, WS), (10) 
 PBBS = B(i, r, z, Y, WS), (11) 
 qKS = V(i, r, z, Y, WS), (12) 
 eFS = F(i, r, z, Y, WS), (13) 
but one of these conditions is automatically satisfied when the other three conditions are 
met because of the balance sheet constraint: 
 MS + PBBS + qKS + eFS = WS = W, (14) 
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where WS denotes the total supply of wealth. Therefore, we only have to consider any 
three equations of the above four; we choose equations (10), (11), and (13). The three 
endogenous variables are the interest rate i, returns on capital stocks r, and the foreign 
exchange rate e. Variables PB, q, and WS are also endogenous because of conditions (8), 
(9), and (14), respectively. The remaining variables in the system (10) through (13) are 
exogenous. 
Substituting equation (14) into equations (10), (11), and (13), we have: 
 MS = M(i*, r*, z, Y, MS + PB(i*)BS + q(r*)KS + e*FS), (15) 
 PB(i*)BS = B(i*, r*, z, Y, MS + PB(i*)BS + q(r*)KS + e*FS), (16) 
 e*FS = F(i*, r*, z, Y, MS + PB(i*)BS + q(r*)KS + e*FS), (17) 
where superscript * indicates the equilibrium value. 
6.6 The effects of an increase in money supply 
We are interested in the effects of an exogenous increase in money supply MS on the 
equilibrium endogenous variables (i*, r*, e*). We consider two kinds of comparative 
statics. The first is the examination of the effects of a simple exogenous increase in 
money supply MS. In this case, the government and the central bank collaborate and 
print the new money, and distribute it to individuals in the nation, similar to the case of 
tax cuts. The most primitive case corresponding to this in the real world is the case 
where the government issues new government bonds, and purchases goods and services 
with the newly printed money. As we are interested in the pure effects of an increase in 
the money supply, we consider the situation where the government reduces its spending 
on other activities by the same amount as the newly printed money. 
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The direct purchase of government bonds by the central bank is of course prohibited 
by law in Japan today. If the government issues new bonds, and if the central bank 
purchases the same amount of older bonds from the markets, however, the result is the 
same as in the case of the direct sale of government bonds by the government to the 
central bank. 
Furthermore, note that this case of a simple exogenous increase in the money supply 
corresponds to the case of an increase in the money supply in the well-known IS–LM 
model. 
Appendix A shows that an increase in the money supply lowers the interest rate, 
di*/dMS < 0, reduces the required rate of returns from stocks, dr*/dMS < 0, and 
depreciates the value of the domestic currency, de*/dMS > 0. 
The second case is the effects of an open market operation (OMO). What are the 
effects if the central bank purchases government bonds from the market? Appendix B 
shows that an increase in the money supply by OMO lowers the interest rate, di**/dMS < 
0, reduces the required stock return, dr**/dMS < 0, and depreciates the value of the 
domestic currency, de**/dMS > 0. 
6.7 Limitations of the model 
6.7.1 Banks 
There are neither deposits nor bank loans in our model. This is clearly a bold 
simplification. However, the significance of our model lies in the demonstration of the 
existence of the transmission mechanism of nontraditional monetary policy even in such 
a primitive model as one with no bank loans. We have shown in our model that an 
increase in the money supply MS lowers the interest rate on bonds i, reduces the 
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required rate of return from stocks r, and depreciates the exchange rate of the domestic 
currency e. This implies that even if lending channels are completely shut down, there 
are still other channels through which monetary policy shocks may be transmitted to the 
real sector. Indeed this was what happened in Japan for the QE period, as we saw in 
Sections 4 and 5. 
6.7.2 Expectations 
Variables in financial markets are forward-looking, and expectations play an important 
role in the real world. However, our model ignores the role of expectations for the sake 
of simplicity. 
For example, our model shows that the purchase of government bonds by the central 
bank reduces the equilibrium interest rate. However, this might not be the case in the 
real world because of expectations among market participants. When the central bank 
purchases government bonds, and when portfolio managers believe that such a policy 
stimulates the economy and that the inflation rate will be higher in the future, then 
portfolio managers are likely to increase the share of stocks and decrease that of bonds 
in their portfolios. (This is because stocks are believed to be a better device than bonds 
for hedging against future inflation.) The decline in the demand for bonds might raise 
the equilibrium rate of interest, contrary to the prediction of the above simple model. 
When expectations change as in the above example, they might shift demand for 
assets in the equations in (4). Strictly speaking, therefore, when we wish to analyze the 
effects of OMO, we should specify demand for bonds B and stocks V as: 
 B = B(i, r, z, Y, WS, B(MS)), (18) 
 V = V(i, r, z, Y, WS, V(MS)), (19) 
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instead of the corresponding equations in (4), where B(MS) and V(MS) denote the 
impacts of an increase of the money supply on the demand for bonds and stocks, 
respectively, through changes in expectations among market participants. In such a 
complicated model with expectations, our standard results obtained, di*/dMS < 0 or 
di**/dMS < 0, may no longer hold. This is all the more likely to happen under a low 
interest rate environment, where the liquidity effect is weak, or almost disappears. 
As in the above example, our simple model with no expectations has some 
limitations for analyzing the real world. Nevertheless, our simplified model is still 
relevant because people form their expectations carefully. They usually base their 
expectations on logical thinking or a simple operational model such as the one in this 
paper. In this case, our simple model with no expectations might still be a good 
approximation to the real world in many situations. 
7. Concluding remarks 
We summarize our findings in this paper. First, the two different VAR analyses, HKT 
(2007) and HT (2011), provided the same qualitative results. That is, changes in the 
TBBR target affect IIP through changes in stock prices. Second, the estimates of the 
impacts of nontraditional monetary policy in HT (2011) are smaller than those in HKT 
(2007). Third, monetary policy shocks during the QE period increased IIP at least 
through the Tobin q channel. However, our empirical results do not exclude possible 
effects through changes in foreign exchange rates. 
Why did stock prices rise when the BOJ raised their operating targets for TBBR 
during the QE period? There are at least two reasons. The first is a simple substitution 
effect between money and stocks, as shown in our simple model in the previous section. 
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The second is that the “expected rate of inflation” in the market rises. Indeed, the 
break-even inflation rate (the nominal yield on standard government bonds with a 
10-year maturity minus the real yield on the corresponding government bonds of the 
same maturity adjusted for future rates of inflation) rose from about 0.2% in March 
2004 to nearly 1.0% in August 2004, and remained roughly there for the rest of the QE 
period (data were obtained from Nihon Sogo Securities in Japan).1 Taking into account 
that there is an upper bound on the returns from bonds, whereas there is no such bound 
on the returns from stocks, some market investors might have shifted their portfolios 
from bonds to stocks, and stock prices increased. 
A rise in stock prices in turn induces corporate managers to collect more funds from 
stock markets and to spend more on their physical capital investment. Hence, 
investment, and thus production increase. 
Why, then, has the Japanese economy been trapped with deflation even after the QE 
monetary policy from March 2001 to March 2006? We conjecture there are at least two 
reasons for this. One, the strength of the recovery from the serious recession was weak 
and slow. Two, it was too early for the BOJ to abandon nontraditional monetary policy 
and send a contractionary financial shock to the market. This contractionary monetary 
                                                  
1 Some doubt about the reliability of the break-even inflation rate in Japan as an indicator 
of future inflation due to the thinness of the market. However, the total balance of inflation 
indexed bonds outstanding at that time roughly corresponds to the total issued stocks 
outstanding of one of largest corporations listed at Tokyo Stock Exchange, and we conjecture 
that the market was thick enough for arbitrage to fully work. (Sekine et al.(2008) report that 
the total balance of inflation indexed bonds was 8.4 trillion yen at the end of March 2008.) 
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policy shock in March 2006 might have hampered the strong recovery of the real 
economy. 
Fourth, the impacts of deleveraging were enormous. Lending channels were virtually 
shut down during the QE period. Fifth, raising the operating target of TBBR to 30–35 
trillion yen at January 2004 seems to have halted the trend of deleveraging. 
Sixth, this paper has an implication for analytic economic models. The well-known 
IS–LM model is based on the assumption that there are two asset classes, money and 
bonds. Arguments regarding the “liquidity trap”, which Hicks (1937) discussed, break 
down if there are more than three assets in the model. Our empirical findings suggest 
that stock prices play a crucial role in transmitting financial shocks to the real sector. 
Therefore, it is not the two-asset model, but the n-asset model, as in Tobin (1969), that 
is relevant for describing the real world today. It is not the interest rate alone as in the 
IS–LM model that transmits financial shocks to the real sector. Changes in the central 
bank’s policy stance are transmitted to the real sector through the prices of all assets, 
including the term structure of interest rates (prices of bonds), stock prices, and foreign 
exchange rates (prices of foreign currencies).2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Kiyotaki and Moore(2012) also discuss the role of monetary policy in a framework of 
multiple assets. 
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Appendix A: Effects of an exogenous increase in money supply 
There are three endogenous variables, (i, r, e), and three equations. Differentiating 
equations (15), (16), and (17) with respect to MS, we have: 
൥
1 െ MହെBହെFହ
൩
ൌ ቎
Mଵ ൅ MହBୗሺdP୆/diሻ Mଶ ൅ MହKሺdq/drሻ MହFୗ
Bଵ ൅ ሺBହ െ 1ሻBୗሺdP୆/diሻ Bଶ ൅ BହKሺdq/drሻ BହFୗ
Fଵ ൅ FହBୗሺdP୆/diሻ Fଶ ൅ FହKሺdq/drሻ ሺFହ െ 1ሻFୗ
቏ ቎
ሺdi∗/dMୗሻ
ሺdr∗/dMୗሻ
ሺde∗/dMୗሻ
቏ , ሺA1ሻ 
where Mj, Bj, Vj, and Fj (j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) denote the partial derivatives of demand for 
money M, bonds B, stocks V, and foreign assets F, with respect to the j-th argument, 
respectively. Solving this system of equations, we obtain: 
 ୢ୧
∗
ୢ୑౏ ൌ FୗሾെBଶሺ1 െ Fହ െ Mହሻ െ BହሺMଶ ൅ Fଶሻ െ BହKሺdq/drሻሿ/∆, (A2) 
dr∗
dMୗ ൌ F
ୗ 
 ሾBଵሺ1 െ Mହ െ Fହ െ Bହሻ ൅ BହሺMଵ ൅ Fଵ ൅ Bଵሻ ൅ ሺBହ ൅ Fହ ൅ Mହ െ 1ሻBୗሺdp୆/diሻሿ/∆, 
   (A3) 
ୢୣ∗
ୢ୑౏ ൌ ሾFଵሼെMଶBହ െ Bଶሺ1 െ Mହሻሽ ൅ FଶሼBଵሺ1 െ Mହ െ Bହሻ െ BହሺVଵ ൅ Fଵሻሽ െ
FହሺMଵBଶ െ MଶBଵሻ ൅ ሼെFଶሺ1 െ Mହ െ Bହሻ െ FହሺBଶ ൅ MଶሻሽBୗሺdp୆/diሻ ൅ ሺBଵFହ െ
BହFଵሻKሺdq/drሻ െ FହBୗKሺdp୆/diሻሺdq/drሻሿ/∆, (A4) 
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where  denotes the determinant of the (3  3) matrix on the right-hand side of equation 
(A1), and is given by: 
∆	ൌ FୗሾMଵሼBଶሺFହ െ 1ሻ െ BହFଶሽ ൅ MଶሼBହFଵ ൅ Bଵሺ1 െ Fହሻሽ ൅ MହሺBଵFଶ െ BଶFଵሻ
൅ ሼMହሺെBଶ ൅ BଶFଶ െ BହFଶ െ Fଶሻ ൅ MଶሺBହ ൅ Fହ െ 1ሻሽBୗሺdp୆/diሻ
൅ ሺെBହMଵ ൅ BଵMହሻKሺdq/drሻ െ MହBୗKሺdp୆/diሻሺdq/drሻሿ
ൌ FୗሾMଵሼBଶሺFହ െ 1ሻ െ BହFଶሽ ൅ MଶሼBହሺFଵ ൅ ܤଵሻ ൅ Bଵሺܮହ ൅ ହܸሻሽ
൅ MହሺBଵFଶ െ BଶFଵሻ
൅ ሼMହሺെBଶ ൅ BଶFଶ െ BହFଶ െ Fଶሻ ൅ Mଶሺെܯହ െ ହܸሻሽBୗሺdp୆/diሻ
൅ ሺെBହMଵ ൅ BଵMହሻKሺdq/drሻ െ MହBୗKሺdp୆/diሻሺdq/drሻሿ.			ሺA5ሻ 
Making use of equations (6), (7), and the assumption of gross substitutes among the 
demand for assets, we can show that the terms in square brackets are positive on the 
right-hand side of equation (A2), positive on the right-hand side of equation (A3), and 
negative on the right-hand side of equation (A4), respectively. Noting that  
1 െ ܨହ ൌ ܯହ ൅ ܤହ ൅ ହܸ	ܽ݊݀	ܨଵ ൅ ܤଵ ൌ െ ଵܸ െ ܯଵ ൐ 0,	 
we also obtain an inequality   0. Therefore, we have: 
 ୢ୧
∗
ୢ୑౏ ൏ 0,
ୢ୰∗
ୢ୑౏ ൏ 0, ܽ݊݀	de∗/dMୗ ൐ 0. 
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Appendix B: Effects of an open market operation 
In mathematical terminology, the central bank’s purchase of government bonds is an 
increase in the money supply MS with a simultaneous decrease in the supply of bonds 
BS. In this appendix, therefore, the supply of bonds BS is endogenous and a function of 
the money supply MS. The system is now composed of the following four equations: 
Mୗ ൌ Mሺi∗∗, r∗∗, z, Y,Mୗ ൅ p୆ሺi∗∗ሻBୗሺMୗሻ ൅ qሺr∗∗ሻKୗ ൅ e∗∗Fୗሻ,																																	ሺA6ሻ 
p୆ሺi∗∗ሻBୗሺMୗሻ ൌ Bሺi∗∗, r∗∗, z, Y,Mୗ ൅ p୆ሺi∗∗ሻBୗሺMୗሻ ൅ qሺr∗∗ሻKୗ ൅ e∗∗Fୗሻ,  (A7) 
e∗∗Fୗ ൌ Fሺi∗∗, r∗∗, z, Y,Mୗ ൅ p୆ሺi∗∗ሻBୗሺMୗሻ ൅ qሺr∗∗ሻKୗ ൅ e∗∗Fୗሻ,																														ሺA8ሻ 
dሾp୆ሺi∗∗ሻBୗሺMୗሻ ൅ Mୗሿ
dMୗ ൌ 0,																																																																																																ሺA9ሻ 
where superscript ** denotes the equilibrium value. Equation (A9) expresses that an 
increase in the money supply MS is equal to the simultaneous reduction in the supply of 
bonds PBBS in absolute value. 
There are four endogenous variables (i, r, e, BS) in the model. Solving equation (A9) 
for (dBS/dMS), we have: 
dBୗ
dMୗ ൌ െሼ1/p
୆ሺi∗∗ሻሽ െ ሼBୗ/p୆ሺi∗∗ሻሽሼdp୆ሺi∗∗ሻ/di∗∗ሽሺdi∗∗/dMୗሻ.																								ሺA10ሻ 
Substituting equation (A10) into equations (A6), (A7), and (A8), we have the system 
of three equations: 
൥
1
െ1
o
൩ ൌ ቎
Mଵ Mଶ ൅MହKሺdq/drሻ MହFୗ
Bଵ Bଶ ൅ BହKሺdq/drሻ BହFୗ
Fଵ Fଶ ൅ FହKሺdq/drሻ ሺFହ െ 1ሻFୗ
቏ ቎
di∗∗/dMୗ
dr∗∗/dMୗ
de∗∗/dMୗ
቏.																						ሺA11ሻ 
Solving this system of equations (A11), we have: 
di∗∗
dMୗ ൌ
Fୗ ቂሺMଶ ൅ BଶሻሺFହ െ 1ሻ െ ሺBହ ൅ MହሻFଶ െ ሺBହ ൅ MହሻK ቀୢ୯ୢ୰ቁቃ
∆୭ ,									ሺA12ሻ 
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dr∗∗
dMୗ ൌ
FୗሾെVହFଵ െ Vଵሺ1 െ Fହሻሿ
∆୭ ,																																																																												ሺA13ሻ 
de∗∗
dMୗ ൌ
ቂെVଵFଶ ൅ VଶFଵ ൅ ሼെVଵFହ െ ሺ1 െ VହሻFଵሽK ቀୢ୯ୢ୰ቁቃ
∆୭ ,																																	ሺA14ሻ 
where o is the determinant of the (3  3) matrix in the right-hand side of equation 
(A11), and is given by: 
∆୭ൌ FୗሾMଵBଶሺFହ െ 1ሻ ൅ MହBଵFଶ െ MହBଶFଵ െ MଵBହFଶ
൅ MଶሼെBହሺMଵ ൅ Vଵሻ ൅ BଵሺMହ ൅ Vହሻሽ
൅ ሺMହBଵ െ MଵBହሻKFୗሺdq/drሻሿ.																																																					ሺA15ሻ 
Using conditions (6), (7), and the assumption of gross substitutes among the demand 
for assets, we can show that the terms in square brackets are positive on the right-hand 
side of equations (A12), positive on the right-hand side of equation (A13), negative on 
the right-hand side of equation (A14), and negative on the right-hand side of equation 
(A15), respectively. Therefore, we obtain: 
ୢ୧∗∗
ୢ୑౏ ൏ 0, 
ୢ୰∗∗
ୢ୑౏ ൏ 0,		and 
ୢୣ∗∗
ୢ୑౏ ൐ 0. 
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TABLE 1 
VAR models 
VAR Model (i) 
Y = (p, y, r, d1  m, s), c = c1 + (c2  d1) 
VAR Model (ii) 
Y = (p, y, r, d1  m, d2  m, s), c = c1 + (c2  d1) 
VAR Model (iii) 
Y = (p, y, r, d1  m, d3  m, d4  m, s), c = c1 + (c2  d1) + (c3  d4) 
 HT (2011) 
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TABLE 2 
Effects of an increase of one trillion yen in operating target 
 Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii) HKT (2007) 
Core CPI 0.004% 0.005% 0.003% 0.021% 
IIP 0.031% 0.067% 0.177% 0.303% 
Stock Prices 0.200% 0.341% 0.918% 2.142% 
 HKT (2007) 
 HT (2011) 
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FIGURE 1. Impulse responses to a quantitative easing policy shock 
Notes: Solid and dotted lines are the point estimates and 90% confidence bounds, 
respectively. The horizontal axis measures months after the policy shock. The units of 
measurement on the vertical axis are the natural logarithm of the variable in levels 
multiplied by 100. 
 HT (2011) 
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Stocks(2001/3 to 2006/3 with data of 2003/3 Excluded as an 
Outlier)
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Figure 4: Stock Prices and Machinery Orders       
(2001/3-2006/3)        (Cabinet Office)
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Figure 5: Total Bank Lending from 2001/3 to 
2006/3
(trillion yen; Kinyu Keizai Tokei Geppo
(Monthly Statistical Reports on Finance and Economy))
